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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
- --- -- - -- - - -- --- -- - -- - - -- --- -- - -- - - -- --- - x
In re:
“AGENT ORANGE” PRODUCT LIABILITY
LITIGATION
- --- -- - -- - - -- --- -- - -- - - -- --- -- - -- - - -- --- - x
THE VIETNAM ASSOCIATION FOR VICTIMS OF
AGENT ORANGE/DIOXIN; PHAN THI PHI PHI;
NGUYEN VAN QUY and VU THI LOAN, Individually
and as Parents and Natural Guardians of NGUYEN
QUANG TRUNG and NGUYEN THI THUY NGA, Their
Children; DUONG QUYNH HOA, Individually and as
Administratrix of the Estate of Her Deceased Child,
HUYNH TRUNG SON; HO KAN HAI, Individually and
as Parent and Natural Guardian of NGUYEN VAN
HOANG, Her Child; HO THI LE, Individually and as
Administratrix of the Estate of Her Deceased Husband, HO
XUAN BAT; NGUYEN MUOI; NGUYEN DINH
THANH; DANG THI HONG NHUT; NGUYEN THI
THU, Individually and as Parent and Natural Guardian of
NGUYEN SON LINH and NGUYEN SON TRA, Her
Children; VO THANH HAI, NGUYEN THI HOA,
Individually and as Parents and Natural Guardians of VO
THANH TUAN ANH, Their Child; LE THI VINH;
NGUYEN THI NHAM; NGUYEN MINH CHAU;
NGUYEN THI THOI; NGUYEN LONG VAN; TONG
THI TU and NGUYEN THANG LOI; On Behalf of
Themselves and Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs,
- against THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, MONSANTO
COMPANY, MONSANTO CHEMICAL COMPANY,
PHARMACIA CORPORATION, HERCULES
INCORPORATED, OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL
CORPORATION, ULTRAMAR DIAMOND
SHAMROCK CORPORATION, MAXUS ENERGY
CORPORATION, THOMPSON HAYWARD
CHEMICAL COMPANY, HARCROS CHEMICALS
INC., UNIROYAL, INC., UNIROYAL CHEMICAL,
INC., UNIROYAL CHEMICAL HOLDING COMPANY,
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KENNETH HOWARD
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UNIROYAL CHEMICAL ACQUISITION
CORPORATION, C.D.U. HOLDING, INC., DIAMOND
SHAMROCK AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS, INC.,
DIAMOND SHAMROCK CHEMICALS, DIAMOND
SHAMROCK CHEMICALS COMPANY, DIAMOND
SHAMROCK CORPORATION, DIAMOND
SHAMROCK REFINING AND MARKETING
COMPANY, OCCIDENTAL ELECTROCHEMICALS
CORPORATION, DIAMOND ALKALI COMPANY,
ANSUL, INCORPORATED, HOOKER CHEMICAL
CORPORATION, HOOKER CHEMICAL FAR EAST
CORPORATION, HOOKER CHEMICALS & PLASTICS
CORP., HOFFMAN-TAFF CHEMICALS, INC.,
CHEMICAL LAND HOLDINGS, INC., T-H
AGRICULTURE & NUTRITION COMPANY, INC.,
THOMPSON CHEMICAL CORPORATION,
RIVERDALE CHEMICAL COMPANY, ELEMENTIS
CHEMICALS INC., UNITED STATES RUBBER
COMPANY, INC., SYNTEX AGRIBUSINESS INC.,
SYNTEX LABORATORIES, INC. and “ABC
CHEMICAL COMPANIES 1-100,”
Defendants.
- --- -- - -- - - -- --- -- - -- - - -- --- -- - -- - - -- --- - x
I, Kenneth Howard Anderson Jr., declare as follows:
Introduction
1.

My name is Kenneth Howard Anderson Jr. In a Declaration of November 2,
2004 (“Opening Anderson Decl.”), I set out my opinions on certain questions
of international law in the above-captioned case. As follow -up to my earlier
opinion, I have been asked to review and comment on the Memoranda of Law
In Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to (1) Dismiss on Justiciability Grounds,
Etc., and (2) Dismiss All Claims For Failure to State a Claim Under the Law
of Nations (collectively, “Plaintiffs’ Briefs”), the Opinions of Professors
Jordan Paust and George Fletcher, and the amicus brief filed on behalf of the
Center for Constitutional Rights, et al., as those materials purport to address
issues of international law. The following sets out my opinion on the most
fundamental misstatements of international law made in these submissions.

(1)

The Prohibition on “Poison” and “Poisoned Weapons”

2.

My primary focus in this section is on the prohibition on poisoning under the
1907 Hague Regulations, rather than that on poisonous gases under the 1925
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Geneva Protocol. First, Plaintiffs emphasize the earlier prohibition in their
briefs and, second, Professor Fletcher concedes that “[I]f the only legal
prohibition relevant to the case were the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the defense
would have a strong position.” Op. of Prof. George P. Fletcher, at 47
(hereinafter “Fletcher Op.”). As discussed at length in my Opening
Declaration, however, the use of herbicides, in fact, falls outside the
prohibitions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.
The Scope and Generality of the Prohibition
3.

Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law on the Law of Nations extensively argues
that customary international law, as embodied in the language of the 1907
Hague Regulations 23(a), prohibits the use of poison or poisoned weapons.
Since that general proposition is both plain and uncontested, it is difficult to
see how that advances the discussion. Plaintiffs further assert, however, that
herbicides such as Agent Orange fall within the customary law prohibition on
poison. On that matter, their international law claims exhibit serious
deficiencies.

4.

Plaintiffs’ lengthy walk through historical basics of the law of war establishes
that the prohibition on the use of poison and poisoned weapons is indeed
ancient; that it is exemplified in certain cases of historical origin – the dipping
of arrows in poison, for example, or the poisoning of wells; that there are also
modern paradigms of the prohibition – for example, poisoned bullets; and,
indeed, that the prohibition against “poison” and “poisoned weapons” was
customary during the Vietnam War and remains customary international law
today. What Plaintiffs fail to establish is the scope of the prohibition on
poison and poisoned weapons, the contours of that prohibition, and
particularly whether it can encompass a prohibition on herbicides in general,
or Agent Orange in particular.

5.

Precisely because the prohibition on poison and poisoned weapons set forth
Hague Regulations 23(a) is so ancient, it is also necessarily at such a level of
generality that – with the exception of a handful of historically accepted
paradigmatic cases – what it actually prohibits is unclear, especially with
respect to modern war-making technology. Despite many pages of
background material, Plaintiffs are unable to provide any test for, or
boundaries of, the rule – they cannot tell us what poison is, or how to
determine what comes within and what falls outside the prohibition. This is,
in fact, unsurprising. According to Thomas and Thomas, “[f]ew writers of
international law, in discussing the rule against the use of poison in warfare,
define the meaning of poison for the purpose of interpreting the rule” and, in
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fact, “an exact and legalistic definition as to what constitutes poison is not
possible.”1
6.

The antiquity and generality of the prohibition on poison have two profound
consequences in the evolution of the laws of war. First, the customary law
prohibition is jealously preserved in the law of war even in the face of
changing technology. This is because the very existence of a widely accepted,
historically-grounded ban on any kind of activity in war is precious, as it
serves by power of example to show that behavior in war can be controlled
even across centuries of armed conflict. But the price of the survival of a ban
across so many centuries and so many technological changes is that it can only
be expressed in very general terms that lack the contours specific to the
technology of any particular generation of warfare. Those of us whose
scholarly preoccupation is both the extension and preservation of a law of war
that can be bequeathed across centuries look with concern upon efforts (such
as Plaintiffs’) t o apply a prohibition of historical generality – a prohibition
whose virtue is its generality and long term power of example – to an
inappropriately narrow and contentious case in order to suit their own interests
without concern for the damage that this may do to the long term survival of
the norm.2

7.

The second significant consequence is that while the general prohibition on
poison and poisoned weapons continues at this level of hortatory generality,
other more specific treaties have emerged as the international law vehicle to
apply the general rule to particular weapons to accommodate the evolution of
warfare. In other words, while the very general, historical prohibition on
poison serves to ground the evolution of specific new norms on specific
weapons, it is these specific treaties that actually govern the weapons in
question, not the general rule. This explains why, for example, states
negotiated the 1925 Geneva Protocol after the gas warfare in the First World
War, clearly demonstrating that they did not believe that the general
prohibition on poison applied to such cases. It is not the case that the ban on
poison has not evolved – on the contrary, it has evolved with impressive
maturity, most recently in the great achievement of the 1993 Chemical
Weapons Convention. But the prohibition has evolved by holding onto the
historical norm as inspiration and aspiration, while (especially where there is
controversy over new technology, as is the case with herbicides) proceeding

1

Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A.J. Thomas, Jr., Legal Limits on the Use of Chemical and
Biological Weapons 50 (1970).
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See e.g., Amicus Brief of Prof. David John Scheffer, 11 (“[B]lurring the clarity of these [war]
crimes or extending them beyond the international consensus of their meaning, or applying
current standards to actions decades earlier all risk undermining the progress made with such
difficulty in the prosecution of atrocity crimes.”)
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by specific instrument and customary law rules of greater specificity than
simply a ban on poison as such.
8.

It might perhaps have happened differently – one can imagine an international
law jurisprudence in which the prohibition on poison grew to apply to new
weapons, such as chemical warfare, by a gradual shifting in states’ shared
understanding of the meaning of “poison or poisoned weapons” in the Hague
Regulations. But this is not how the evolution of international law in fact took
place – the theory offered by Plaintiffs gives no persuasive reason why parties
would have bothered to negotiate, draft and sign a wholly separate 1925
Geneva Protocol, for example, if all the limitations sought in that agreement
could have been achieved by a simple customary law understanding of the
meaning of poison and poisoned weapons. There was, in fact, a good reason
why states-parties went for the approach they did during the 20th century – it
was to preserve the aspirational value of the ancient rule, on the one hand,
while providing clear, detailed rules for new technologies, especially where
there was controversy, on the other.

9.

Understanding the development of the rules on poison and chemical weapons
demonstrates why the general and ancient rule still stands with such dignity
and yet is unavaila ble for the specific purposes for which Plaintiffs attempt to
use it. The general prohibition bears the weight of centuries by being notably
vague on precisely the kinds of details which Plaintiffs mistakenly seek to
ascribe to it.

10.

The understanding I have outlined of the Hague Regulations 23(a) is the same
given by one of the most distinguished commentators on the law of war, Frits
Kalshoven, in a treatise published by and under the imprimatur of the
International Committee of the Red Cross. “Although not without all
relevance even to contemporary warfare,” says Kalshoven, the prohibition on
the use of poison or poisoned weapons embodied in Article 23(a) “nonetheless
is of mainly historical interest.”3 And the reason why it is of mainly historical
interest? Because, consistent with the path of the law of war’s development in
this area, the law has evolved through specific instruments and therefore,
Kalshoven concludes, of “greater remaining importance is the Geneva Gas
Protocol of 1925.” 4

11.

A similar understanding of Hague Regulations 23(a) was given by the ICJ in
its advisory opinion on the legality of using nuclear weapons, which Plaintiffs
heroically (but vainly) cite as support of their position. In fact, however, the
view of the ICJ is brutally simple: although the Court recognized the historical
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Frits Kalshoven and Liesbeth Zegveld, Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction to
International Humanitarian Law 42 (ICRC 2001).
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Id.
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and aspirational value of the ban on poison, it also acknowledged the
prohibition’s generality and the fact that poison is not defined at all, let alone
with the specificity necessary to determine whether or not particular modern
weapons are covered by the rule. The ICJ acknowledges that many differing
interpretations exist on the scope of Hague Regulations 23(a),5 but further
notes a perfectly logical reason for this, which is that the notable tendency of
20th century international law has been to ban weapons by specific treaty,
rather than by recourse to vague generalities historically found in customary
law.6
12.

A key factor in this trend toward dealing with specific weapons by specific
treaty was the wides pread use of chemical gas weapons by leading states in
the First World War. In essence, state practice – a critical component in the
evolution of customary international law – declared that whatever scope the
prohibition of Hague Regulations 23(a) had prior to the Great War, the rule
thereafter could no longer be said to cover chemical gases intended to be lethal
or severely damaging to human beings. One may take the view that state
practice of the First World War constituted so massive a violation of the
Hague Regulations 23(a) rule as to rewrite it, or one may alternatively take the
view – as leading states did – that in fact the rule never encompassed these
new technologies, even poison gases and liquids aimed deliberately at killing
or severely damagin g human beings.7 Either way, the result is the same.

5

Case Concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8
July 1996 , General List No. 95, 1996 I.C.J. 226, para. 55 (observing that “the Regulations
annexed to the Hague Convention IV do not define what is to be understood by ‘poison or
poisoned weapons’ and that different interpretations exist on the issue”). Available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm.

6

Id., at para. 57 (“The pattern until now has been for weapons of mass destruction to be declared
illegal by specific instruments.”).
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In fact, Professor Fletcher cites a German academic, Professor Gerhard Werle, opining that the
idea that the prohibition against poison does not apply to poison gas would seem “at first blush to
be remote because munitions based on poison entail toxic damage to the body … The ban against
poison in [Hague Regulations] 23(a) codified customary international law, but this ban could not
take a stand on modern weapons like ‘gas weapons’ because these weapons were not known at
the time.” Fletcher Op., 48. Plaintiffs also rely heavily on conclusions of the SIPRI study, yet
even a former Project Leader of SIPRI's Biological and Chemical Warfare Project, Dr. Jean
Pascal Zanders, has noted how thoroughly – contrary to Plaintiffs' claims – States and their
negotiators before, during, and after the First World War distinguished between gas weapons and
traditionally prohibited “poisons” under the Hague Regulations. See Jean Pascal Zanders,
International Norms Against Chemical and Biological Warfare: An Ambiguous Legacy, 8 J.
Conflict & Security L. 391, 407 (2003) (“The delegates at the First Hague Conference in 1899
made no direct association between poison and poison gas … After the First World War, many
German and Allied experts and public figures supported the distinction between poisoned and
chemical weapons.”). See also Cyrus Bernstein, War Law Notes: The Law of Chemical Warfare ,
10 George Washington Law Review 889, 907 (1942) (“United States never considered those
provisions as applicable to chemical warfare”); Major Joseph Burns Kelly, Gas Warfare in
International Law , 9 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 43-44 (1960) (“No general rule laid down in ... the Hague
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Hague Regulations 23(a) was limited, in the wake of the First World War, to
its historically paradigmatic cases, on the one hand, and its aspirational value,
on the other – and neither of these help Plaintiffs.8
13.

On the relevance of the prohibition on poison to modern chemical warfare,
Thomas and Thomas conclude that:
The Hague interdiction of poison has been subject to so many
differences of opinion among legal authorities in relation to chemicalbiological agents that it becomes impossible to point with any certainty
to its relevance as to any prohibitory effect in the chemical-biological
field …. [D]isputes exist as to whether certain agents are poison so as
to fall within this rule; whether agents would be encompassed if not in
existence prior to 1907; and whether the rule was intended to apply to
chemical- biological weapons in any event. This divergent thought
makes these pre-World War I conventional principles of extremely
limited utility as legal fetters on the use of chemical-biological agents
in war.9

14.

As Plaintiffs cannot find a specific prohibition in international law on the use
of herbicides or Agent Orange, they have attempted to deduce such a result
from an ancient and general prohibition. Yet Plaintiffs’ theory cannot explain
the First World War, state practice and opinio juris following that war, the
necessity of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or, for that matter, the existence of the
Chemical Weapons Convention. Nor can it explain how Hague Regulations
23(a) could apply to chemicals not aimed at or intended to harm humans,
when it does not even cover chemical weapons intended to be lethal to human
beings. Plaintiffs simply cannot deduce a specific prohibition on the use of
Convention IV of 1907 can be said to prohibit, by analogy, gas warfare”); U.S. Rules of Land
Warfare, War Department Basic Field Manual FM 27-10, para. 25 (1940) (“practice of recent
years has been to regard the prohibition against the use of poison as not applicable to the use of
toxic gas.”).

8

In the event that Plaintiffs cannot rely on Hague Regulations 23(a), their attempt to bring the use
of herbicides within Hague Regulations 23(e), which prohibits weapons “calculated to cause
unnecessary suffering,” is also flawed. As stated in my Opening Declaration at paras. 46-48,
Plaintiffs seem unaware that this prohibition has been historically limited to weapons which cause
additional, and unnecessary, injury to a combatant already rendered hors de combat by some
other means. It is not a broad prohibition intended to apply to excessive force, collateral damage
or to more general notions captured by the requirements of military necessity. By its express
terms, it is also limited to weapons “ calculated to cause” superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering, which is clearly inapposite to this case as even Plaintiffs don’t allege that was Agent
Orange’s purpose. Finally, the prohibition is “too vague to produce by itself a great many
practical results,” which is why Professor Fletcher concedes (as he must) that the norm would not
be actionable under the ATS. Kalshoven and Zegveld, supra note 3, at 41.
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Thomas and Thomas, supra note 1, at 57.
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herbicides or Age nt Orange from a general prohibition that has not evolved
with the times but rather is limited to certain paradigmatic cases. 10
Plaintiffs Confuse Common Law Reasoning With Customary International Law
15.

The way in which Plaintiffs, their experts and amici address the scope of
Hague Regulations 23(a) underscores a broader problem with their general
approach to determining the content of international law. Plaintiffs seem to be
under the mistaken impression that treaties and other international agreements
can be treated largely as though they were statutes within the U.S. domestic
legal system, and that customary international law (presumably because it is
not codified) can be treated as though it were another body of domestic
common law. We should not forge t that not all nations whom international
law seeks to bind have a common law tradition, and, for a variety of reasons,
this dependence on U.S.- and common law-centric forms of reasoning and
interpretation produces results under what purports to be “international law”
that are unrecognizable to international law scholars and practitioners. 11

16.

In the present case, one manifestation of this mistakenly common law
approach is found in Plaintiffs’ immense over -reliance on analogical

10

Professor Fletcher claims that while Defendants demonstrate the requirement of intentionality
with respect to poisoned weapons, they somehow doom their case by not addressing the issue of
“poison” alone. I find no authority in international law that places such special weight on the
distinction between “poison” and “poisoned weapons”; rather, commentators almost uniformly
treat it as an emendation designed to ensure that methods of delivery are included as well as
poison itself. This is not the same as the distinction, which was historically very sharply drawn,
between conventional poisons and poisoned weapons, and chemical gas weapons used in the First
World War. For example, “[a]fter investigating the first German chemical attacks near Ypres in
April 1915, Dr. J.S. Haldane never referred to ‘poison’ in his report dated 27 April 1915 to Earl
Kitchener, Secretary of State for War. He wrote about ‘asphyxiating gas’, ‘irritant gas’, ‘gas’, and
so on. The XIVth Report by the Commission of Inquiry on the Violation of the Rules of the
Rights of Nations, and of the Laws and Customs of War transmitted to the Belgian Minister of
Justice, M. Carton de Wiart, on 24 April 1915, similarly referred only to asphyxiating gases and
the Declaration (IV, 2) and not to the 1907 Hague Convention.” Jean Pascal Zanders,
International Norms Against Chemical and Biological Warfare: An Ambiguous Legacy, 8 J.
Conflict & Security L. 391, 408 (2003).

11

Statute of the International Court of Justice, opened for signatureJune 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 59
Stat. 1031 (“The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: (a) international conventions, whether general or
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; (b) international
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations; (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means
for the determination of rules of law”). See generally, Curtis Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith,
Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position , 110
Harv. L. Rev. 815, 838-842 (1996-1997) (acknowledging the “questionable pedigree” of recent
U.S. cases espousing a new version of customary international law that replaces the traditional
view of international law with one that is “less tied to state practice.”).
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reasoning. Lacking any grounds to specify the contemporary content of the
ancient prohibition on poisons and poisoned weapons, Plaintiffs automatically
rely on analogies – Agent Orange is like this kind of ancient poison, it
resembles such poisons in its deployment and use, therefore, Agent Orange is
just another form of poison and is banned by the ancient prohibition. However
persuasive – or not – such reasoning might be in a common law setting, this
case involves the determination of the content of international law – an
exercise which necessarily requires using the methods, content, sources, and
hierarchies of authority of international law, not those of the common law.
However persuasive an analogy might or might not seem, customary
international law is not established through the use of analogies – it is
established by evidence of what has been accepted as law through state
practice and opinio juris.12
17.

A second manifestation of Plaintiffs’ mistaken common law approach is their
reliance on the background materials to treaties, such as the 1925 Geneva
Protocol, as a primary means of ascertaining their meaning. For example,
Plaintiffs place a great deal of emphasis on a few statements by members of
delegations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol negotiations, speculating as to the
possible future development of new anti-plant technologies. Plaintiffs claim
that, given this reference, the Protocol should be construed to encompass such
technologies. However, international trauvaux preparatoires cannot be used
in the same way that legislative history is often used within U.S. domestic
jurisprudence. Background materials in treaty drafting do not provide an
authoritative guide to, or primary means of, treaty interpretation – they may
only be used as a supplementary means of interpretation in certain
circumstances. 13 Treaties among states parties are far more like contracts than

12

In certain limited cases, for example the 1925 Geneva Protocol, treaties will direct consideration
of analogous substances, but that is not the approach generally adopted under customary
international law.

13

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, art. 31, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entry into force 27 January 1980) (“(1) A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
the light of its object and purpose. (2) The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty
shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement
relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of
the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. (3)
There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement
between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the
parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties. (4) A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established
that the parties so intended.”)(emphasis added); art. 32 (“Recourse may be had to supplementary
means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its
conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning

9

legislation – because states are jealous of their sovereign rights, treaties are
strictly construed, and the idea of common law courts fashioning terms to fill
in what some might regard as “gaps” is not only unfamiliar but is actually
antithetical to the process of international law-making by treaty. 14
Intent and Mens Rea With Respect to Poison
18.

Even if we were to accept that the prohibition on poison included the use of
herbicides in general, or Agent Orange in particular, which it clearly did not,
what mens rea would be required to turn the mere use of such material into a
war crime? Would it require a specific intent to poison, for example, or would
it be enough to have a general intent with some level of knowledge of
poisonous effects? Would recklessness or negligence be sufficient?

19.

The 1907 Hague Regulations do not specify a mens rea requirement for the
prohibition on poison. This is hardly surprising given that codification of war
crimes, with formal elements, and so on, is very much a process of the late
20th century; even Nuremberg proceeded (and ended) with many of those
fundamental issues unresolved. It was not something contemplated by the
1907 Hague Regulations, which view the laws of war in terms of traditional
state-to-state obligations, rather than the modern approach which focuses on
criminal liability of individuals. Furthermore, it is not as if courts have heard
prosecutions for violations on the customary law ban on poisoning in war that
have resulted in courts determining what standard of intent applies. Such
prosecutions, in the period of modern law of war dating from the 19th century,
have not occurred, as Professor Fletcher himself notes when quoting Knut
Dörmann, writing under the imprimatur of the International Committee of the
Red Cross, saying that “[t]here seems to be no case law on the mental element
of this crime [of employing poison] to date.” Fletcher Op., at 52 n.44.

20.

Given this, Professor Fletcher and Professor Paust have attempted to try to
find the appropriate mens rea by means which, if this were a common law
inquiry, might be thought exemplary, but which, in the context of determining
customary international law, are alien to interna tional law and therefore
unpersuasive. Professor Fletcher reaches to the Rome Statute establishing the
International Criminal Court and the Model Penal Code promulgated by the
ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable.”)(emphasis added).

14

The consent -based nature of international law is clearly established by the judgment of the
Permanent Court of International Justice (the precursor to the current International Court of
Justice) in the Lotus case, where the Court held that rules of international law binding upon states
emanate “from their own free will,” so consequently “restrictions upon t he independence of States
cannot therefore be presumed.” The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 10, 18 (Sept. 17).
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American Law Institute to come up with a standard of purpose, knowledge,
reckle ssness or negligence. Fletcher Op., 51-53. Professor Paust reaches to
his own scholarly writings and two pre-Sosa ATS cases to come up with a
standard of wantonness, reckless disregard or even criminal negligence. Op.
of Prof. Jordan J. Paust, 26 (hereinafter “Paust Op.”). Neither proposal
provides any guidance about the mens rea requirement for poisoning during
the Vietnam War.
21.

Professor Fletcher’s reliance on the Rome Statute as evidence of international
law binding on the U.S. in the 1960s is utterly flawed – the U.S. is not a party
to the treaty, which in any event was only drafted in the late 1990s. The Rome
Statute can serve as a point of comparison in some limited circumstances –
Defendants have cited it, for example, to show that international law today,
even by leading states other than the United States, does not support the claim
of corporate liability, let alone thirty years ago. But despite explicitly stating
that the Rome Statute “does not apply retroactively to actions committed in the
1970s,” Fletcher Op., 42, Professor Fletcher proceeds as though it did. 15
Professor Fletcher relies upon the Rome Statute (a brand new Statute) to
establish a mens rea standard for poisoning, Fletcher Op., 52, without even
considering whether this standard reflected customary international law as it
existed in the 1960s and 1970s. Were that not enough, he also fails to note
that the United States is not a party to the treaty, having taken the radical step
of “un-signing” the treaty in order not to be bound by it. 16

22.

Furthermore, Professor Fletcher acknowledges that the Rome Statute does not
create a particular mens rea requirement for poison, so he instead relies on the
default mens rea provided by the Rome Statute’s general elements of crime,

15

As I noted in my Opening Declaration, international law does not generally permit retroactive
application of laws. See Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law
155 (7th rev. ed. 1997) (referring to the “general principle that laws should not be applied
retroactively”); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature23 May 1969,
art. 28, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entry into force 27 January 1980) (treaties “do not bind a party in
relation to any act or fact which took place … before the date of the entry into force of the treaty
with respect to that party”); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for
signature 17 July 1998, art. 22(1), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entry into force 1 July 2002) (a person
“shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes,
at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court”).

16

It would be truly remarkable for a U.S. court to cite as authority of international law a treaty
which the executive has taken such pains not to be bound by and, further, to de-legitimat e as
contrary to the U.S. view of international law and contrary U.S. security interests. It would also
be contrary to acts of the legislative branch, including the enactment of the American
Servicemen’s Protection Act, which provides for the possible use of force, including armed
military force, to protect U.S. military personnel from being taken under the jurisdiction of the
ICC.
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which includes intention and knowledge. 17 Fletcher Op., 52. But Professor
Fletcher ignores the fact that the United States delegation to the Rome Statute
proposed (a) that poison be defined as a “substance specifically designed to
cause death through the toxic propertie s of poison chemicals or agents”18 and
(b) that the prohibition only apply where an accused “intentionally attacked an
adversary in that armed conflict with poison” and that, “at the time of the
attack, the accused was aware of the nature of the weapon he w as using and its
prohibited status under the circumstances.” 19 Thus, Professor Fletcher’s
reliance on the Rome Statute – which was negotiated more than 30 years after
the Vietnam War and which has been expressly rejected by the United States –
cannot provide evidence of the requisite mens rea for poisoning in this case.
23.

As for Professor Fletcher’s reliance on the Model Penal Code, Fletcher Op.,
51-2, there is absolutely no basis for thinking that the mens rea standard for a
particular rule of international law can be found by looking at general mens
rea requirements under the domestic model code of a single nation. This
approach (which, again, is antithetical to the foundation of international law

17

Professor Fletcher’s conclusion that poisoning does not require specific intent because where such
intent was required, the drafters of the Rome Statute clearly and unambiguously provided for it by
using words such as “intentionally” or “willfully” (Fletcher Op., 52-53), reveals a lack of
appreciation for the drafting history of the Statute: see Johan D. Van der Vyver, The International
Criminal Court and the Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law, 12 U. Miami Int’l &
Comp. L. Rev. 57, 111-13 (2004) (rejecting the assertion that war crimes listed with these
qualifiers require specific intent while all others require general intent, and concluding instead
that these words are “redundantly repeated in the definition of the war crimes concerned and that
this redundancy is entirely attributable to definitions being taken from existing treaties in force
and the drafters’ resolve to retain that language as far as possible”). Professor Fletcher also
mistakenly concludes that the default requirement of intent and knowledge (which he mistakenly
states as being intent or knowledge) is broadly defined (Fletcher Op., 52) – in fact, the mens rea
requirement is very strict, requiring an act and its consequences being intended or else foreseen as
a certainty: see id., at 62-72; Donald K. Piragoff, Article 30: Mental element, in Commentary on
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article 527,
533-34 (Otto Triffterer, ed. 1999).

18

See Proposal submitted by the United States of America, Draft Elements of Crimes, Preparatory
Commission for the International Criminal Court, New York, 4 February 1999, 4, para. 19,
PCNICC/199/DP.4 (“Poison means any substance specifically designed to cause death through
the toxic properties of toxic chemicals or agents which would be released as a result of the
employment of munitions or devices. It does not include riot control agents designed to cause
temporary incapacitation. It includes asphyxiating gases as well as any other analogous liquid,
material or device.”).

19

See Addendum, Proposal submitted by the United States of America, Draft Elements of Crimes,
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, New York, 4 February 1999, 14,
PCNICC/1999/DP.4/add.2 (“Elements [of Article 8.2(b)(xvii): War crime of employing poison]:
1. That the act took place in the course of international armed conflict. 2. That the accused
intentionally attacked an adversary in that armed conflict with poison. 3. That, at the time of the
attack, the accused was aware of the nature of the weapon he was using and its prohibited status
under the circumstances.”).
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making) is also contrary to the requirement in Sosa that courts look to
international, not domestic, law to determine the existence and contours of an
international law norm. 20
24.

Professor Paust’s proposal fares no better. He relies on a treatise that he
authored and two pre-Sosa cases involving the ATS as the basis for a mens rea
standard of “wanton, reckless disregard or even criminal negligence” for
“causing” the poisoning of food, water or human beings. Paust Op., 26.
These sources provide no support for a mens rea requirement of less than
specific intent for the prohibition on poison. First, none actually discuss the
mens rea for poisoning – in fact, none address the law on poisoning at all. As
for the cases, Kadic dealt with allegations of genocide, rape, and torture, while
Gramajo concerned allegations of summary executions, disappearances,
torture and arbitrary detention; Paust’s own work is limited to consideration of
command responsibility. 21 Second, both cases cited deal primarily with
allegations involving much higher mens rea standards, such as “directing,”
“personally planning,” or “ordering” war crimes. Finally, the only area in
which a lower mens rea requirement is suggested is in the context of
command responsibility, which has no application in this case. Defendants in
this case were not comma nders, military or civilian, and the U.S. government
could hardly be considered a subordinate whose actions Defendants had the
ability to control, prevent or punish. Thus, these cases and articles cited
provide no basis for suggesting a mens rea requireme nt of wanton
recklessness or negligence for the prohibition on poisoning.

25.

Not only are these supposed mens rea standards suggested by Professors
Fletcher and Paust not derived from customary international law, but it is clear
that they are inconsistent with the history of the prohibition on poison.
Professor Fletcher identifies the prohibition on poison as deriving from the
rules against treachery and perfidy – poison is “dishonorable because it is
secret, duplicitous, and perfidious” and poison is “treachery because it kills
secretly.”22 Fletcher Op., 36, 39. The treacherous nature of poisoning is
evident in all of the paradigmatic historical cases of poisoning, including
poisoning wells, throwing poisoned candy across enemy lines and dipping

20

Sosa, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2759 (noting that the “ATS was meant to underwrite litigation of a narrow
set of common law actions derived from the law of nations…”)(emphasis added).

21

Kadic v, Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass.
1995); Paust, Bassiouni, et al., International Criminal Law: Cases and Materials 46-70 (2nd ed.
2000).

22

Professor Fletcher also urges that the ban on poison has an adjunct historical justification, viz., a
ban on “starvation and devastation implicit in destroying the food and water supply of [sic]
enemy.” Fletcher Op., 42. I address that strand of thought below.

13

arrows int o poison. 23 But the very notion of treachery and perfidy requires a
deliberate intention to deceive – one cannot be negligently duplicitous,
recklessly treacherous, or unintentionally perfidious. 24 That is why the
archetypal cases of poisoning require a specific intent to poison, rather than
any of the reduced mens rea requirements urged by Professors Fletcher and
Paust.
26.

A specific intent mens rea requirement for poisoning is also substantiated by
numerous international law sources, which I referred to in my Opening
Declaration. 25 These include an advisory opinion of the ICJ, which held that
Hague Regulations 23(a) did not apply to nuclear weapons because the
poisoning effect of radiation is only a secondary or incidental effect of the
weapon, as well as s trong statements by leading military powers (the United
States and United Kingdom) that the prohibition requires a specific intent to

23

The original grounding of the prohibition on poisoning in the rule against treachery is further
illustrated by the former U.S. position that certain acts of poisoning, such as placing dead animals
in the water to contaminate the water supply, were permissible provided the contamination was
evident or notice to the enemy was given. See U.S. Rules of Land Warfare, War Department
Basic Field Manual FM 27-10, para. 28 (1940). This qualification of permitting poisoning that
was evident or accompanied by notice was ultimately eliminated because giving effective notice
was not practicable during times of war. See U.S. Department of the Army, International Law,
27-161-2, 41 (1962).

24

The intentionality requirement of treachery and perfidy is evident in legal definitions of the terms
because both are based on deliberate acts of betrayal. For example, Article 37(1) of 1977
Additional Protocol I defines perfidy as “[a]cts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead
him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence, shall
constituted perfidy” and provides examples of perfidy, including “feigning an intent to negotiate
under a flag of truce,” “feigning of an incapacitation,” “feigning civilian, non-combatant status”
and “feigning of protected status.” (The United States accepts this Article as a statement of
customary international law: see Michael J. Matheson, Session One: The United States Position
on Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions , 2 Am. U. J. Int'l Pol'y 419, 424-25 (1987) ("We support the principle [referring to
Article 37] that individual combatants not kill, injure, or capture enemy personnel by resort to
perfidy, and that internationally recognized protective emblems, such as the red cross, not be
improperly used.")). In its Commentaries on the Protocol, the ICRC describes the mental
element of perfidy as “the intentional and conscious deception of the adversary.” ICRC
Commentaries, Art 37, para. 1500. Similarly, the U.S. Army Field Manual describes forbidden
acts of treachery and perfidy in the following way: “It would be an improper practice to secure an
advantage of the enemy by deliberate lying or misleading conduct which involves a breach of
faith, or when there is a moral obligation to speak the truth. For example, it is improper to feign
surrender so as to secure an advantage over the opposing belligerent thereby. So similarly, to
broadcast to the enemy that an armistice had been agreed upon when such is not the case would
be treacherous.” U.S. Dept. of The Army Field Manual: The Law of Land Warfare (FM 27-10),
para. 50 (1956). These instances are distinguished from ruses, surprise attacks and ambushes,
which are permitted by the laws of war.

25

See Opening Anderson Decl., paras. 38-45.
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poison or use poisonous weapons and does not apply in cases where the
weapon created toxic byproducts or where the poison was a secondary or
incidental effect.26 More generally, it is clear that many weapons with
poisonous byproducts – such as incendiary weapons – have never been
thought to fall within the prohibition on poison. I have also urged attention to
highly respecte d scholarly commentary concluding that a specific intent to
poison, or a specific intent found through the design of a weapon intended to
poison, such as poisoned bullets, counts as evidence that specific rather than
merely general intent is required. 27 All of these international sources
explicitly address the prohibition on poison and find a requirement for specific
intent.
Plaintiffs’ Reliance on the DOD Memoranda and the SIPRI Study
27.

Plaintiffs place considerable emphasis on a 1945 Department of Defense
General Counsel memorandum on the proposed use of herbicides in the
closing days of the Second World War. Pls.’ Mem. In Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot.

26

Case Concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8
July 1996 , General List No. 95, 1996 I.C.J. 226, para. 55 (“The terms have been understood, in
the practice of States, in their ordinary sense as covering weapons whose prime, or even exclusive,
effect is to poison or asphyxiate”); Letter dated 20 June 1995 from the Acting Legal Adviser to
the Department of State, together with Written Statement of the Government of the United States ,
at 24, written pleadings in Case Concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, General List No. 95, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (Hague
Regulations 23(a) was “not intended to apply, and has not been applied, to weapons that are
designed to injure or cause destruction by other means, even though they also may create toxic
byproducts ”); Letter dated 16 June 1995 from the Legal Adviser to the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, together with Written Statement of the
Government of the United Kingdom, at 48, written pleadings in Case Concerning the Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996 , General List No. 95,
1996 I.C.J. 226 (Hague Regulations 23(a) was intended to apply to weapons whose primary and
intended effect was to be “poisonous and not to those where poison was a secondary or incidental
effect. ”).

27

Stephan Oeter, Means and Methods of Combat, in The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed
Conflicts 149 (Dieter Fleck, ed. 1995) (“[t]he most important point concerning all these disputes
about the definition of ‘poisonous gases’ … is the intentional design of a weapon in order to
inflict poisoning as a means of combat. Only in so far as the poisoning effect is the intended
result of the use of the substances concerned does the use of such munitions qualify as a use of
‘poisonous gases’. If the asphyxiating or poisoning effect is merely a side-effect of a physical
mechanism intended principally to cause totally different results (as e.g. the use of nuclear
weapons), then the relevant munition does not constitute a ‘poisonous gas’.”). Professor Fletcher
is critical of citation by both Professor Reisman and myself of Stephen Oeter as an expert source.
Fletcher Op. at 49-50. Stephen Oeter was writing, however, in Dieter Fleck's Handbook of
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts which, as Sir Adam Roberts notes, is the “English version
of the German [military] manual, with extensive commentary.” Adam Roberts, The Law of War
and Environmental Damage , in The Environmental Consequences of War 47, 54, n.16 (Jay E.
Austin & Carl E. Bruch, eds., 2000). Thus, this volume is considered the authoritative
commentary on the military manual of a leading NATO military power.
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To Dismiss All Claims for Failure to State Claim Under Law of Nations, 8184, 149, 170. They argue that becaus e the memorandum explicitly concludes
that the use of herbicides that are, or are believed to be, “harmless to man,” are
legal, the memorandum thus also implicitly concludes that the use of
herbicides not “harmless to man” are illegal. However, an answer to one
inquiry does not give an answer to the other. The 1945 memorandum
addressed only the narrow and specific issue of whether a herbicide which was
assumed to be harmless to humans would be prohibited per se; the memo
concluded that such use was not so prohibited. The memo cannot be assumed
to have addressed the separate and further question of whether a herbicide
assumed to be harmful to humans might also be prohibited per se. In fact, the
memorandum closes with the following: “[s]hould further expe rimentation
disclose that [the herbicides in question] are toxic to human beings, I will be
pleased to express my opinion on the facts which may be presented for
consideration.” 28 Furthermore, when the United States and other states did
address this issue, they concluded that the prohibition on poison did not apply
to weapons or materials having an incidental or secondary poisoning effect. 29
28.

Plaintiffs’ international law brief is also noteworthy for its extraordinary
reliance on a single source, a 1975 study by the research and advocacy
nongovernmental organization, the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI), which Plaintiffs cite at least 79 times. I am among SIPRI’s
many admirers worldwide as a research and advocacy organization. It ha s
been a crucial political and activist actor in important disarmament campaigns
over decades, including campaigns against chemical and biological weapons.
Moreover, its empirical research, attempting to chart the scope and flow of
weapons of many kinds, is crucial to researchers, activists, and others seeking
to identify who has weapons of what kind and how many.

28

Major General Myron C. Cramer, Judge Advocate General, Memorandum for the Secretary of
War: Destruction of Crops by Chemicals , SPJGW 1945/154 (March 1945), reprinted in United
States: Department of Defense Position With Regard to Destruction of Crops Through Chemical
Agents, 10 I.L.M.1300, 1305 (1971).

29

See, e.g., U.S. Department of the Army, International Law, 27-161-2, 43 (1962) (prohibition on
poison does not reach use of nuclear weapons where radiation is simply a side effect of the blast,
but it might reach uses of nuclear weapons where radiation was the only intended effect of the
blast); Letter dated 20 June 1995 from the Acting Legal Adviser to the Department of State,
together with Written Statement of the Government of the United States, supra note 26; Letter
dated 16 June 1995 from the Legal Adviser to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the
United Kingdom, together with Written Statement of the Government of the United Kingdom,
supra note 26; Walter Krutzsch and Ralf Trapp, A Commentary on the Chemical Weapons
Convention 8, n.5 (1994) (Herbicides were excluded from the Chemical Weapons Convention:
“Herbicides will not be regarded as chemical weapons if used with an intent to destroy plants.
That would apply even if the (secondary) effect of such use were the killing or harming of people,
for example by toxic side effects of denial of food supplies.”).
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29.

That said, SIPRI is what it is – a political advocacy organization, albeit one
that is organized around considerable research. However impressive and
reliable its information-gathering may be, SIPRI’s studies on the law of
disarmament, arms control and chemical and biological weapons simply
cannot be read – as Plaintiffs would have this Court do – as disinterested,
scholarly treatises on these subjects. See Pls.’ Mem. In Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot.
to Dismiss All Claims for Failure to State Claim Under Law of Nations, 16
n.2. On the contrary, it is an archetypal example of advocacy presented as
scholarship.30 Produced in the early 1970’s at the height of international
indignation against the Vietnam War, and against the U.S. for its use of
herbicides, the SIPRI study is massively researched, well written, fascinatingly
detailed – and quite plainly a lawyer’s brief. It cannot, in my view, possibly
be called “scholarship” within the meaning of the hierarchy of international
law sources on international law, if for no other reason than that it is
inconceivable that SIPRI, given its advocacy charter and political orientation,
could have reached a different conclusion, no matter what evidence of
international law was in front of it. In sum, Plaintiffs’ brief is supported, not
by scholarship and genuine treatises, but by an astounding number of citations
to what is in effect an advocate’s manifesto dressed up as scholarship.

(2)

Military Necessity and Crop Destruction

30.

Professor Fletcher claims strongly and repeatedly – and his assertion is echoed
by Plaintiffs in their international law brief – that Professor Reisman and I
argue that military necessity can prevail over per se prohibitions of the laws of
war. He says, for example, that Professor Reisman and I take the position that
the “principle of necessity prevails over the strict prohibitions of the written
law … Whatever serves the greater good becomes legal – regardless of the
prior judgment by contracting parties that the weapon should be strictly
prohibited … the rule of necessity eliminates all the specific, black-letter
prohibitions in the Hague and Geneva Conventions.” Fletcher Op., 54-55.

31.

Professor Fletcher has simply created a straw man, as no reasonable person
could read my Opening Declaration (or Professor Reisman’s) in the manner he
suggests. On the contrary, a central theme of my Opening Declaration is that
even if a weapon is not prohibited per se by laws such as the prohibition on
poison or poisoned weapons, or the prohibitions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol,
its use would not necessarily be lawful. It might still be the case that the
actual uses of the weapon would fail the test of proportionality – military
necessity versus harm caused – and thus violate international law. Of course,
military necessity cannot justify the use of a weapon that is per se prohibited
by the laws of war, but then, no one besides Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ expert

30

See Opening Anderson Decl., paras. 29-32 (citing Flores v. Sout hern Peru Copper Corp., 343
F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2003)).
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ever suggested that it did. Instead, my Opening Declaration demonstrates that
the use of Agent Orange was neither per se prohibited nor in violation of the
laws of military necessity and proportionality.
32.

Straw -man arguments aside, what are we to make of Plaintiffs’ arguments
concerning crop destruction? Professor Paust comes to the conclusion that
“[w]hether or not all herbicides were illegal per se, the destruction or
poisoning of food, crops, or water that noncombatants might use was
prohibited per se.” Paust Op., 27. This conclusion, however, collapses
together at least three separate issues, each with a separate legal test – the
poisoning of crops; the destruction of crops where it is not known whether
they were intended solely for enemy consumption; and the destruction of
crops whose destination is reasonably believed to be dual use, i.e., partly for
enemy combatant consumption and partly for civilian consumption.

33.

With respect to poisoning of crops, it is only illegal per se if it comes within
the prohibition on poison stated in Hague Regulations 23(a). Yet, as
demonstrated above, the prohibition on poison was never intended to apply to
herbicides in general or Agent Orange in particular.

34.

With respect to the destruction of crops where it was not known whether they
were destined solely for combatant consumption, customary international law
during the Vietnam War era did not prohibit such crop destruction per se , but
instead permitted it provided it was justified by military necessity and
proportionality. 31 This fact is clearly acknowledged by Plaintiffs’ own expert,
then-Captain Jordan J. Paust, in an article published in 1972, where he
observed that these “same rules of war [of military necessity] are applicable to
crop destruction by chemical defoliation or other means. Legality would
hinge upon a conclusion of military necessity as opposed to something merely
of a military benefit … Military necessity also plays an important role in the
legality of the use of chemicals to destroy food.” 32 (It is also noteworthy that
Professor Paust did not mention the prohibition on poison once in his
contemporaneous analysis of the legality of crop destruction in Vietnam.)

35.

It is true that the laws on the destruction of civilian objects, including crops,
have become stricter since the end of the Vietnam War. 1977 Protocol I put in
place an innovative regime for ensuring civilian access to objects
indispensable for civilian survival, as well as much stricter rules today

31

This would typically occur in situations where the destruction of crops was collateral to some
other military objective. For example, destruction of crops might be justified by military
necessity if enemy troops were hiding in the crops and the military benefit of destruction
outweighed the potential civilian harm caused.

32

Captain Jordan J. Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader Responsibility, 57 Mil.
L. Rev. 99, 156, n. 223 (1972).
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regarding the protection of civilian objects generally. But those rules were not
in force during the Vietnam War, were clearly acknowledged to be a departure
from the existing customary international law during that period, and are not
binding on the United States because it has refused (to this day) to ratify the
Protocol. Furthermore, the purpose of these new rules is to prevent starvation
of civilians during wartime, which is inapplicable here because the Amended
Complaint does not allege starvation or related deprivations.
36.

With respect to destruction of crops reasonably believed to be intended for
both civilian and enemy combatant use, the test during the Vietnam War (as
well as today, given that the U.S. has not accepted 1977 Protocol I) is what has
already been described as the proportionality test – that is, military necessity
set against the cost to civilians. If the use of herbicides was not prohibited by
Hague Regulations 23(a) or the 1925 Geneva Protocol, then they are subject to
exactly the same tests as any other means or method of warfare, whether
bullets, artillery shells, incendiaries, fuel air explosives, or any other of the
myriad and distressing means of killing and destroying the enemy. As the
U.S. Army Field Manual says, the “measure of permissible devastation is
found in the strict necessities of war.” FM 27-10, at para. 56 (1956).

37.

Finally, although Plaintiffs challenge the view that military necessity is nonjusticiable, Defendants’ view is supported not only by the Government in its
Statement of Interest 33 but also by Plaintiffs’ own expert. Professor Fletcher
acknowledges that it would be difficult to base a claim under the Alien Tort
Statute on violations that depend on modifiers such as “disproportionate” or
“unnecessary” and that an “inquiry [in]to the ‘necessity of war’ undermines
the black-letter specificity of the norm and makes it problematic to draw an
analogy to the three Blackstonian paradigms” required by Sosa. Fletcher Op. ,
26, 34. I could not agree more with Professor Fletcher on this particular point.
Proportionality is not susceptible of the specificity required for justiciability
under Blackstonian concepts; this is a recognition not only of the inability to
draw it under the ATS given Sosa, but also the inability to draw it under
judicial review generally, as a matter of international law (which explains the
lack of case law on pure cases of military necessity).

38.

Rules on lawful and unlawful collateral damage – of which the destruction,
whether by chemicals or any other means, of dual use crops is an insta nce –
are about proportionality and the balancing of military necessity and civilian
harm. Were that not the case, then either collateral damage would always be
unlawful, no matter how minimal its extent in relation to military advantage;
or it would always be lawful, no matter how great its extent in relation to
military advantage. It is plain that neither of these is the case, and
proportionality is the rule.

33

See Statement of Interest of the United States, 34-35.
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(3)

The lack of precedent for international corporate liability

39.

Reading the Plaintiffs’ briefs and expert opinions on corporate liability, I am
struck by three things. First, Plaintiffs and their experts base their argument
for corporate liability almost exclusively on U.S. case law, despite Sosa
requiring courts to look to at whether international law extends liability to
corporations – which it clearly does not. Second, Plaintiffs rely heavily on
academic work describing what certain academics think international law
ought to be, rather than descriptive academic commentary about what
international law actually is. 34 Third, sources on which Plaintiffs and their
experts rely make crucial errors in interpreting international law, which, when
exposed, make clear that international law does not recognize corporate
liability.

40.

First. Sosa requires courts to look not only at whether certain conduct is
prohibited under international law, but also to determine whether
“international law extends the scope of liability … to the perpetrator being
sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual.”
Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766 n.20 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs, on the contrary,
rely almost exclusively on U.S. case law to establish a precedent for corporate
liability under international law.35 However, U.S. cases do not themselves
create international law and the cases cited do not provide good evidence of
international law because many of them either rely primarily on other U.S.
case law, rather than international law as such, or else misinterpret
international law. There are no international law precedents as such in favor
of Plaintiffs’ argument.

41.

Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides
that judicial decisions, which include decisions of national courts, may be
referred to as “subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of
[international] law.” The word subsidiary is used to signify that the primary
sources of international law remain treaties, custom and general principles.
Something is not international law just because U.S. courts say it is, just as
something would not be international law just because English courts or

34

See Opening Anderson Decl., paras. 29-31.

35

Plaintiffs’ experts criticize me, as well as Professor Reisman, for failing to deal sufficiently with
U.S. case law interpreting the law of nations in other ATS cases, and in particular for failing to
explain Sosa to this Court. Naturally I have views on the meaning of Sosa and would be happy to
offer them to the Court, and I agree with Plaintiffs’ experts that there is some overlap between
international law and the U.S. domestic requirements of the ATS. I was asked to render an
expert opinion on whether certain conduct was prohibited under international law, which is of
course the first step in determining whether a claim can be brought under the ATS. I have done
so by consulting international law sources recognized under, and according to the hierarchy
established by, international law itself. If that makes me an “international law purist,” in
Professor Fletcher’s words, then I make no apology for that fact.
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Russian courts say it is. Decisions of national courts can and do play a role in
establishing customary international law, but only to the extent they reflect
general and consistent state practice, particularly as evidenced in treaties to
which states have affirmatively committed themselves. Yet on the issue of
corporate liability under international law, a handful of U.S. courts stand
alone. Their decisions are contrary to all international precedents and they are
entirely unsupported by state practice, opinio juris, or treaty law.
42.

Second. Despite express warnings from higher U.S. courts for over a hundred
years - cases ranging from The Paquete Habana to Flores - Plaintiffs and their
experts rely on academic work that can only be characterized as describing
what they believe international law ought to be, rather than what international
law actually is. 36 Plaintiffs’ primary expert on international corporate liability,
Professor Paust, cites extensively to his previous works to support his
conclusion that international law recognizes corporate liability, with
approximately one third of his citations on the issue being to himself.37
Professor Paust’s articles, read as academic interpretation of how one might
imagine a regime of corporate liability, are of considerable importance within
the give-and-take of academic international law; I am among their admirers.
Yet these articles are clear examples of precisely the type of work Flores
warned courts not to accept as evidence of international law because they
represent lex ferenda (what the law ought to be) dressed up as lex lata (what
the law is).

36

See e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“[W]here there is no treaty, and no
controlling executive or legislative act or juricial [sic] decision, resort must be had to the customs
and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and
commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly
well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial
tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for
trustworthy evidence of what the law really is .”)(emphasis added); Flores , 343 F.3d at 157-58,
n.26.

37

The few genuinely international law sources cited by Professor Paust seem to me highly
inapposite. For example, I cannot comprehend why Professor Paust cites the International Court
of Justice’s decision in Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Ltd, (Belgium v. Spain),
1970 I.C.J. 3, for the principle that corporations have an important role in international law. Paust
Op., 4. That case arose out of bankruptcy proceedings for a Canadian company (Barcelona
Traction) in Spain. Belgium filed the case on behalf of its citizens who were shareholders in
Barcelona Traction for damage they allegedly suffered as a result of acts contrary to international
law committed towards the company by Spain. Not only could the corporation itself have never
bought this claim, because it had no standing under international law - the case was not (and could
not have been ) brought against the corporation because it did not have international legal
obligations or international legal personality. The only decision reached by the Court was that the
state of Belgium also did not have standing to bring the case – it certainly did not address the
issue of corporate responsibility under international law.
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43.

Other scholars cited by Plaintiffs, such as Professor Steven Ratner, approach
the nascent development of international corporate liability more honestly by
giving explicitly aspirational accounts of how corporations should be held
liable, without pretending that these are descriptive accounts of how they can
actually be held liable under current international law.38 Professor Ratner’s
aspirational account is intellectually imaginative and possibly even persuasive
as an account of how the law should evolve – but its intellectual
persuasiveness lies in no small part in the fact that it does not claim that such a
regime exists today, let alone thirty or more years ago.

44.

Nor can the question of time and the law-in-force be elided. U.S. cases cited
by Plaintiffs are all cases dealing with the law today or relatively recently,
long past the period of the Vietnam War. For example, both Kadic and
Talisman dealt with conduct allegedly occurring in the 1990s.

45.

Third. Plaintiffs base their conclusion in favor of international corporate
liability almost entirely upon academic sources, and Professor Paust’s articles
in particular, that are questionable in context of litigation rather than the
academy. These academic sources are in turn supported, if at all, merely by
U.S. decisions which operate (as noted earlier in this Reply Declaratio n) on
the dubious assumption that customary international law is merely a variety of
traditional common law reasoning. As also noted earlier, such national court
case law falls at the bottom rung in the hierarchy of sources of international
law. In addit ion, and most unfortunately, these cases oftentimes simply get
international law wrong.

46.

Consider, for example, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy,
Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), a case revered within this U.S.centric body of case law finding international corporate liability. Talisman is
cited principally for the proposition that any non-state actor, including a
corporation, could be liable under international law. Yet, significantly, it did
so based primarily on another case, Kadic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995);
that case held only, however, that an individual could be held liable under
international law. But Kadic does not create a precedent for liability of all
varieties of non-state actors, including all juridical persons, under international
law. The Talisman court, however, seemed to see its great leap forward as
nothing more than an uncontroversial instance of U.S. common law reasoning
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Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 Yale
L.J. 443 (2001) (suggesting a theory of corporate respons ibility given that international law
generally places duties on states, and only recently on individuals, but has not yet extended
liability to corporations); see also Note, Corporate Liability for Violations of International Human
Rights Law, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2025 (2001) (acknowledging that “international law is virtually
silent with respect to corporate liability for violations of human rights. International law has
neither articulated the human rights obligations of corporations nor provided mechanisms to
enforce such obligations.”).
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applied to international law – a mistake as breathtaking in its hubris as in its
ignorance of how international law is actually made.
47.

Taken together, these interlinked bits of U.S. case law and academic
commentary on which Plaintiffs rely all participate in a dangerously parochial
process of self-amplification. A small but crucial mistake appears in one case,
perhaps nothing more than an imprecision of wording. That imprecision is
seized upon in another case and in academic commentary and inflated. That
inflation is cited by another case and in more commentary. The result is a
busy cottage industry at work on what is merely a laboriously constructed
house of cards, self-referential case law and commentary that spirals upwards
in a positive feedback loop, self-congratulatory, and closed off to the outside
world of international law. It may be a self -satisfying exercise to those
engaged in it; seen from the outside, however, it bears little relationship to
international law.

48.

Looking beyond Plaintiffs’ misuse of sources in reaching its conclusions about
corporate liability, what then are we to make of the substance of Plaintiffs’
arguments? The main reasoning of the Plaintiffs and the U.S. cases on
corporate liability can be summed up as follows: (1) International law imposes
criminal liability on individuals for certain violations of international law; (2)
individuals and corporations are both non-state actors, so there is no reason to
differentiate between the liability of individuals and corporations; (3)
international law therefore imposes liability on corporations for certain
violations of international law. But this argument is flawed because
international law does differentiate between individuals and corporations and
it does not treat all non-state actors alike. In an effort to force the conclusion,
Plaintiffs have impermissibly run together unlike categories.

49.

International criminal law imposes obligations only on individuals, not
corporations. 39 This is evident from the jurisdiction of the International
Military Tribunals in Nuremburg and Japan, as well as the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the
International Criminal Court, which are all limited to violations by individuals.
In fact, even under today’s law, a proposal to extend international liability to
corporations was expressly rejected in negotiations over the Rome Statute for
the International Criminal Court. At least for the time being, the concept of
corporate liability has been knowingly and intentionally rejected by statesparties fully aware of the kinds of arguments made by numerous activists and
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See Amicus Brief of Prof. David John Scheffer, 9 (“[C]orporate civil liability for atrocity crimes
[is] a theory that is only beginning to be considered by the courts and was certainly not accepted
as customary international law during the 1960s. Despite the rapid development and prominence
of individual criminal responsibility during the last ten years, following the creation and
jurisprudence of international hybrid tribunals, criminal liability concerning natural persons has
not been extended to civil liability for corporate behavior.”).
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academics in favor of such liability. The result is that none of the international
criminal law cases holding individuals liable cited by Plaintiffs support the
conclusion that international law recognizes corporate liability. As I
discussed at length in my Opening Declaration, international law clearly
distinguishes between individuals and corporations, and individual criminal
liability thus does not provide a precedent for corporate liability.
50.

In an effort to move beyond individua l criminal responsibility, Plaintiffs cite
the ability of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremburg to declare
certain organizations criminal, but this does not create a precedent for
corporate liability. Article 9 of the IMT provided that: “At the trial of any
individual member of any group or organization,” the Tribunal could declare
the group or organization to be a “criminal organization.” Article 10 then
provided that members of such a criminal organization could be tried before
national courts, and the “criminal nature of the group or organization is
considered proved and shall not be questioned.” The argument that this
provision provides a precedent for corporate liability is mistaken on several
levels.

51.

Declarations that an organization was criminal could only occur in the context
of a criminal trial of an individual member. The Tribunal did not have the
power to hear prosecutions of, or civil claims against, criminal organizations.
Further, the only organizations declared criminal by the Tribunal were
political “quasi-state” organizations, such as the SS and the Nazi party, not
commercial or juridical entities. Finally, the possibility of declaring
organizations criminal has not been adopted in the statute of any subsequent
international court or tribunal, so it hardly counts as something on which there
is general and consistent state practice or universal acceptance. All of this is
discussed at length in my Opening Declaration, but Plaintiffs have failed to
address those arguments head-on.

52.

Plaintiffs then shift to a different claim, this time arguing that even if
international law does not recognize direct corporate liability, international
law somehow mysteriously permits “indirect” corporate liability because it
recognizes, in narrow circumstances, the concept of aiding and abetting
liability. Unquestionably, the Nuremberg cases established that individuals
may be held liable for aiding and abetting certain international crimes, though
there were few cases on the issue until the advent of the recent international
criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. But the existence
of these cases is not sufficient to show what Plaintiffs must show – that
corporations, and not just the individuals who were worked for or owned
them, may be held liable. Furthermore, it is not clear that the concept of
aiding and abetting, which developed in the criminal sphere, can be applied in
a civil context. Once again, Plaintiffs seek to extrapolate a norm that has been
developed only in the context of individual criminal responsibility to
corporate civil liability, in defiance of the overwhelming evidence to the
contrary.
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53.

Plaintiffs then shift to a different and quite extraordinary claim that
international law somehow imposes obligations on corporations because, it is
said, there is no doctrine of corporate immunity under international law. The
brief by amicus Center for Constitutional Rights in particular makes this
argument, claiming that Defendants misconceive the issue because if there is
no affirmative doctrine of corporate immunity, then corporations may be held
liable. Br. Amici Curiae, 24-26. The claim is surprising since one would
hardly expect something that is not, in fact, a subject of international law at all
nevertheless to be the object of specific doctrines of international law, such as
corporate immunity. One might have thought that if it was not a subject of
international law, then international law would have little, if anything, to say
about it.

54.

It is Plaintiffs, not Defendants, who have the burden of proving so novel a
proposition as that international law imposes obligations on corporations; they
cannot shift that burden onto Defendants by claiming that Defendants must
prove the existence of an affirmative immunity doc trine when the evidence is
plain that corporations are not subjects of international law in the first place.
International law has never recognized corporate liability, and Plaintiffs and
their experts have not pointed to a single international or non-U.S. case that
has held otherwise. This means that there is no general and consistent state
practice – to the contrary, there is much evidence for the exact opposite – in
favor of holding corporations liable for international law violations in the first
place, which is what Plaintiffs have the burden of proving.

55.

Finally, it should be noted that all of these analogies to individual criminal
liability suffer from a further problem, noted in my Opening Declaration, that
they are criminal cases. International law does not even have the concept of
the civil liability of any private party, even individuals, except in the narrowest
of circumstances. 40 Inconvenient as it is for Plaintiffs, the existence of a body
of narrow criminal law involving individuals does not alter the fact that what
they seek is something that does not exist at present, let alone during the
Vietnam War – viz., the concept of international tort law. Perhaps the world
would be a better place if such international law existed, and perhaps it w ill
come into being. But if so great a change does come about, it will happen the
way in which international law is principally made, through state practice.
And if so, it will, almost inevitably, be treaty law negotiated, and widely
consented to, by states – not by the piecemeal actions of U.S. courts urged to
make it up as they go along.
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For example, the statute of the ICC makes reference at Article 75 to a quasi-criminal, quasi-civil
concept of restitution by individuals in war crimes circumstances, but that is a novel provision in
a late-1990s treaty which has, moreover, been rejected by the United States. The 1907 Hague
Regulations make passing reference to state compensation for violations of the laws of war –
apparently in the context of monetary restitution in war as an alternative to what might otherwise
trigger the far more dangerous and bloody remedy of reprisal – but this is entirely about states.
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I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on February 8, 2005 in Washington, D.C.

______________________________
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